CHAPTER 2 THE STRUGGLE FOR TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS
Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller I. THE TR ANSNATIONAL SOCIAL QUESTION Financial crises, food crises, environmental crises, migration crises: world society is facing dramatic challenges. Th ese crises are both interconnected and rife with contradictions. While the Euro zone bailout fund is leveraged with roughly a trillion euro, nobody seems willing to put up the 13 billion dollars which, according to UN calculations, would be necessary to relieve world hunger. Deutsche Bank, a German high-street bank, generated a benefi t of 4 billion euro in 2014; meanwhile more than 1.3 billion people around the world live in poverty, on less than 1.25 US dollars per day. Refugees fi nd themselves in a particularly precarious situation. In 2014, there were more than 50 million displaced persons, a situation the UN High Commissioner for Refugees attributes to urbanisation, food and water insecurity, as well as shortages of raw materials. Th ese global problems, he says, "are increasingly inter-related, exacerbating confl ict and combining in other ways that oblige people to fl ee their homes". 1 Th ese trends point to one conclusion: the "social question" is now fi rmly a transnational social question. 2 Societal confl ict lines no longer run primarily along national borders. Th e global economy, global politics, transnational law, and global scholarship and science all contribute, in their own way, to the formation of zones of social exclusion. Th e axes of disadvantage can intersect and be exacerbated. Th e existing transnational power structures are both complex and merciless. Th ose worst aff ected do not even have -or are deniedaccess to the very means for sheer survival. Nation states no longer possess 1 António Guterres, "Forced Displacement: Responding to the Challenge of the Next Decade, Statement to the Berlin Symposium for Refugee Protection", June 2011, available at: www. unhcr.org/4c1737c09.html. Intersentia adequate solutions to these problems. Nor do they remain the only important players in this fi eld. Sociologists and political scientists accept that the state is just "one of the actors" when it comes to global social policy, and acknowledge that non-state actors such as international organisations and global social movements have now fi rmly gained entrance to the "contested terrain" of emerging global governance. 3 It is on this contested terrain that the debates on the crises facing world society are played out. It is here, for instance, that political scientists are making the link between climate change and global social policy. 4 Th e interdisciplinary research group FLOOR (Financial Assistance, Land Policy, and Global Social Rights) explores the possibility of securing a global system of guaranteed basic income. 5 Philosophers study the requirements of global justice and put forward the charge that "our failure to make a serious eff ort toward poverty reduction may constitute not merely a lack of benefi cence, but our active impoverishing, starving, and killing of millions of innocent people by economic means". 6 Law, too, is itself a contributor to this state of aff airs. Transnational law paved the way for and enabled the various crises. Th e global players of industry have long had a hand in shaping transnational law. Transnational corporations operate in global markets, bolstered by international contracts based upon the so-called lex mercatoria, the self-regulating law of global commerce. Th ey have developed techniques to ensure that the law remains in their service, and have shaped a world that corresponds to their own vision. Huge international law fi rms off er the legal know-how required to assert and secure a company's interests. Judicial forums have been installed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and at the World Bank, in which the law of free trade and the rights of private investors are both enforced and re-inforced. To leave transnational legal policy to the global players and limit ourselves to mitigating the consequences of globalisation in national welfare states is to address merely the symptoms, while failing to tackle the root of the problem. Th is is why we need to look for new ways to renew the promise of global social justice. In a bid to establish the relevant necessary steps, we will examine four distinct issues: (1) What are the central characteristics of the global crises? (2) What role does transnational law play? Should we turn to the law at all, or is it an instrument of domination with which it is too perfi dious even to engage? (3) What is the current state of transnational social rights? Where can they be found? (4) Which concrete legal and political mechanisms can be used in order to challenge the course of neoliberal globalisation?
A. THE COUNTER-HEGEMONIC AGENDA Ever since the 1980s, a neo-liberal trend has dominated the development of transnational law. Th is development can be seen in the international institutions of the global economy, such as the WTO and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Th is trend pushes for the liberalisation of the markets and protects the global players -not social rights. 7 Yet, there are an increasing number of groups that seek to counter neo-liberal norms with an agenda of transnational social rights. Brazilian farm workers invoke social human rights as they call for land reform as a necessary pre-condition for food sovereignty and a life without poverty. 8 German students have instigated court proceedings against the introduction of university tuition-fees, relying on the obligation contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ( ICESCR) to ensure access to higher education "by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education". Anti-racist networks are demanding social rights for illegalised immigrants. "Nomadic universities", networks of academics and other temporary university employees, are calling for a charter of social rights, including the right to a basic income, the right to cross-border mobility, and the recognition of common goods such as natural resources or social infrastructure as " Commons" which should not rely on private property rights. 9 In December 2011, the International University College of Turin launched an initiative towards a "European Charter of the Commons", with a particular focus on strengthening the global protection of communallyheld resources, such as water, through a process of "globalisation from below".
All of these movements rely on the central idea of human rights: that every human being -regardless of where he or she is from -has the right to rights. 10 Th e call for "transnational social rights" is increasingly central to the activities of globalisation critics. Th ey are based upon the understanding that rights must be realised by "fi ghting for the democratisation of transnational institutions". 11 Th ereby, they use the label "transnational social rights", broadening the traditional understanding of social rights to one which also includes environmental rights, migrant rights and the right to a guaranteed basic income. Th e framework as a whole can also be seen as a project in which seemingly independent or distinct discussions fi nd a common thread, which serves to off er them a joint foundation and the potential for combined action. Th is is because these various initiatives are concerned not solely with countering the globalisation of capital, of the markets and of goods with a globalisation of social rights. 12 Transnational social rights, as a whole, are moving towards a counter-hegemonic agenda, one which relies on rights which already exist.
Th e transnational framework is not intended to distract from the political decision-making of national governments or communes. What it does do, however, is shift the perspective. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt express this best when they write that globalisation is not just one thing, but a collage of disparate processes. Our political task, they argue:
"is not simply to resist these processes but to reorganize them and redirect them towards new ends. Th e creative forces of the multitude that sustain Empire are also capable of autonomously constructing a counter-Empire, an alternative political organization of global fl ows and exchanges." 13 Based upon the appeal of a "counter-empire", a transnational legal policy is called for, one which focuses on social and ecological justice, and which explores how the potential of world society could be used to establish alternatives to the existing socio-economic conditions.
B. JURIDICO-POLITICAL STRUGGLES
Following on from the series of questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, we wish to put forward four overarching theses with regard to the transnational constellation.
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1. Th e social question traverses borders. In other words, it is a transnational social question:
Solving the twenty-fi rst century social question cannot be achieved by addressing only the contradictions within nation states. Even the development of social rights within nation states oft en relies on factors and institutions outside the control of the political institutions. Th e causes of the present fi nancial crisis, climate change and the global food crisis all lie within world society. It is at this level that we must tackle them.
2. World society is determined by new contradictions, collisions, and fragmentations. Transnational law forms part of this contradictory system, and is, as such, part of the problem:
Huge corporations have long been operating on transnational terrain, in which transnational law plays a central role. Th e law provides neo-liberal ideas with a secure legal foundation, corporations with a global playing-fi eld, and investors with the safeguarding of their property. To the state, it off ers legitimacy for military action. Moral appeals and non-committal political announcements are not enough to deal with the fl agrant dangers inherent to an unfettered global economy, with multi-national corporations, or with fundamental socio-economic confl icts.
3. Transnational social rights can lead to the formation of a counter-law. Th is counter-law should ensure that the global social order is determined by world society itself, instead of by those who profi t, economically and politically, from globalisation.
Th e social human rights of the UN Covenants together with the European Social Charter and the Core Labour Standards of the International Labour Organization ( ILO) already provide a body of transnational social rights. Th ese can act as a starting point in the struggle for law. Th e goal must actually be to redeem the promises of social and ecological security, democratic participation and involvement, which are contained in these documents.
4. Th ere are many juridico-political arenas in which the strengthening of transnational social rights is needed.
Within the state, eff orts must be made to ensure that transnational social rights are binding before the courts. Th is will bolster the monitoring procedure of the UN Covenants and the ILO. In addition, the Social Charter must attain a central role at European level. A European social union must replace the current economically driven European organisation. At transnational level, not only international organisations such as the UN and the WTO, but also nongovernmental organisations and transnational corporations, must be obliged to uphold transnational social rights.
Intersentia

II. THE TR ANSNATIONAL CONSTELLATION
Th e word "globalisation" is oft en invoked to refer to a number of phenomena, such as the growth in transnational economic relations and the increasingly important role of international institutions, as well as the interdependence of nation states. As a result, the debate on globalisation oft en remains superfi cial, merely scratching the surface of the issues, without actually addressing the underlying structures that are shaping the transition to a world society. Th e transnational constellation is not just the manifestation of international state co-operation and world trade. A more far-reaching change of perspective is required in order to understand fully the root causes of globalisation. Th e increasing connectivity of social relationships around the world in the most diverse sections of society means that the phenomena of globalisation extend far beyond the transborder, capitalist, global economy. Its processes are not limited to business and politics but also exert infl uence in the fi elds of religion, art, and education, as well as in technology and risk regulation, transnational public spheres and cyberspace. While the international system of states nonetheless remains important, it no longer enjoys the absolute primacy that it did before. World society is a society both without a head and without a centre. Centralised zones of political decision-making within various similarly structured states are now things of the past. A highest point of decision-making in a unitary nation state no longer exists.
Within this complex world society, the creditworthiness of states is determined by the rapid risk assessments of rating agencies, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports put national education systems under pressure to adapt, and oppositional movements turn to social networks to topple authoritarian regimes. Th is de-centralisation and diff erentiation of world society are Janus-headed phenomena, off ering new opportunities and changing power structures while simultaneously evoking great risks. Th is poses the transnational social question. In the last years, it has primarily been the big players of the global economy and fi nancial markets, who have feathered their own nests at the expense of the environment and social justice. Yet global science and technology also generate new risks to health and to the environment. Diff erent social sectors tend to maximise their own forms of logic and impose them on their social environments. Th e WTO, the World Bank and the lex mercatoria are among those that have assumed a dominant role within this transnational constellation in their attempt to universalise their free-market liberal Esperanto. 14 In doing so, they hope to assert their interests, their way of thinking and their rules on all other social spheres. Th e systematic desire for power is evidenced by the important roles played by politico-economic institutions such as the WTO and the IMF, which form the regulative framework for the global relations of production.
Th e political institutions, however, are not the only ones growing in the process of global governance; they are joined by legal institutions. Legal norms and the reach of courts are expanding into more and more aspects of society. It seems that there are no limits to what can be considered and decided as a legal question. States have set up courts such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), regional human-rights courts, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as the monitoring bodies of universal human rights treaties; the United Nations has established ad hoc criminal tribunals, and the international community has permitted the prosecution of international crimes in East Timor and elsewhere before so-called hybrid courts. National courts are included into this system of world courts, 15 such as when US courts hear compensation cases arising from grave human-rights violations in South America or a Dutch court orders Shell Nigeria to compensate Nigerians for oil pollution damage caused by third-party sabotage in Nigeria. 16 Th ese forums are also on the rise outside the state-created system of global jurisdiction: transnational corporations assert the lex mercatoria through privately established courts of arbitration. 17 International judicative and quasijudicative bodies, such as the World Bank's International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), are on their way to becoming world courts. 18 It is clear that law has long been transnational, aff ording rights to, and imposing duties on, individuals, states and transnational corporations. 19 Th e only way to ensure that this transnational law upholds basic social and environmental justice is -as Otto von Gierke put it -to allow the necessary "drops of socialist oil" to fi lter through the legal system. 20 15 See George Scelle's theory of "dédoublement fonctionnel" in: idem, Précis de droit des gens, Vol. I, (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1932) 
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Th e complexity of the transnational constellation is brought sharply into focus by the response to the global food crisis, within which we see various crisis points collide with devastating eff ects. In 2009, shortly before the G20 states gathered for their summit in Pittsburgh, Olivier De Schutter, the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, issued a statement in which he called on the G8 and G20 states not to limit their discussions to the fi nancial and economic crisis, but to strive also to reach agreements on fi ghting global hunger, stating:
"Just like the collapse of large banks, widespread hunger entails systemic risks." 21 Th is is, indeed, the case. Since 2008, we have seen, parallel to the global fi nancial crisis, an intensifi ed worldwide food crisis. Th e explosion in food prices led to an extra 40 million people going hungry in 2008 alone, bringing the number of people worldwide who are living in hunger to over one billion. More people die each day from hunger than in all the military fl ashpoints around the world combined. A report of the World Bank of 2011 22 made clear that the huge increase in the number of people living in hunger is largely due to the commodifi cation of food production, food price fl uctuations, and the economic crisis. Th e 82 states then classifi ed as Low-Income Food-Defi cit Countries, i.e., countries which depend on food imports in order to meet their own demand, were aff ected particularly badly by the crisis.
Th e food crisis is not, however, merely a crisis of supply. We are also noticing a crisis in climate, which is rendering entire regions unsuitable for farming. A closer look at the economic structure of the agricultural sector confi rms that the current food crisis will not simply lead back to the ostensibly older phenomenon of malnutrition. Th e unfolding of events is now shaped by global speculation on food products and by the major agricultural companies. "Agribusiness", which incorporates huge agricultural companies such as Monsanto, concentrates on industrial growth and the development of monocultures at the expense of ecological structures and smallholders.
Such fi rms sell their patented, genetically engineered seeds and matching pesticides at high prices to farms. If a farmer suff ers a crop failure and subsequently cannot aff ord the newest plant technology, he or she goes bankrupt. Farmers who do not subscribe to seed-buying from such large companies are oft en sued if patented plants are found growing in their fi elds, even if the land was cross-contaminated through no fault of the farmer. obtain large tracts of land in the Global South, striking deals with the relevant governments and driving small farmers from their holdings. 23 Th is land is generally used to grow monocultures such as soya, which is shipped back to the company's home country to be used as fodder or as palm oil, which is used in the production of so-called "agrofuel". Th is practice of land expropriation is now known as " land grabbing". 24 During the 1990s, foreign direct investment in agriculture amounted to an annual average of 600 million USD; between 2005 and 2007 this rose to an average of 3 billion USD. 25 Th is structural change is leading to an increased globalisation of the agricultural industry, a process dominated by large transnational companies. It is estimated that roughly 50 million hectares of land are aff ected, in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Th ese land deals are about more than just profi t, they are also made with an eye to geo-strategic interests and spheres of infl uence. Th e climate crisis and population growth in many parts of the world has turned the issue of nutrition into a geo-strategic question of power. Th us, agribusinesses oft en co-operate with the governments of the countries in which they are based, including the governments of states in the Global South, in order to secure a competitive advantage in the approaching fi ght for food supplies.
Th e phenomenon is best evidenced by the case of Madagascar, where the South Korean fi rm Daewoo sought to obtain 1.3 million hectares of land. According to the NGO Grain, the land was to be used solely for the cultivation of maize and palm oil for export back to South Korea. Madagascar belongs to the poorest third of the world and is plagued with malnutrition and poverty. Th e land grabbing resulted in a severe setback for the country's already ailing food supply system. Th e Madagascan government backed the deal with Daewoo but was subsequently toppled by widespread protest against Daewoo's land acquisition. Th e new government was able to revoke the deal, and the Daewoo Corporation has, for the time being, withdrawn from the transaction.
What is driving these scandalous developments which are exacerbating the food crisis and expropriating whole sections of the population? Th is question brings us back to the UN Rapporteur's appeal to the G20 states. Th e NGO Grain points to a direct link to the crisis in the fi nancial markets: "Given the current fi nancial meltdown, all sorts of players in the fi nance and food industries -the investment houses that manage workers' pensions, private equity funds looking for a fast turnover, hedge funds driven off the now collapsed derivatives market, grain traders seeking new strategies for growth -are turning to land, for both food and fuel production, as a new source of profi t." 26 Th e interplay between these two phenomena is instantly clear. Th e economic crisis has shown fi nancial products to be extremely risky, and so the search begins for "future-proof" investment options as an alternative to capital markets. It becomes apparent that agricultural land is being imbued with a new signifi cance: it is being transformed into a commodity and recast as a whole new economic sector. Its attractiveness as an investment rises with the threat of climate change, which is posed to reduce the amount of land available. More frequent extreme weather conditions will see entire tracts of land sink into the sea. Th e greenhouse eff ect will be amplifi ed though the expansion of industrial agriculture which relies on the use of chemicals and the depletion of natural resources. Th e dynamics of the fi nancial, food, and climate crises are gradually combining to form a global social crisis. 27 Th ese developments will also have consequences for migration patterns; the World Bank identifi es high food prices as a signifi cant trigger for the movement of refugees. Th e World Bank also points out that an eff ective response to these crises cannot be found within the individual sectors and calls, instead, for "an integrated agricultural, food security, poverty, and climate agenda". 28 instrument of domination. Th is line of argument is particularly pertinent when it comes to the transnational constellation. Th e law constructs a veil of equality and thus obscures the reality of socio-economic inequality. And no one can say that everyone has the same access to legal procedures. Who can match the resources of transnational companies or the giant factories of advocates known as international law fi rms? How many people have the requisite know-how to bring a case before the International Court of Justice? Th e idealistic belief in civilising the world through law may seem naïve if one fails to take into account the simple fact that the very starting point for this juridico-political struggle is rife with inherent inequalities. Th e law merely provides a liberal smokescreen to obscure the inherent injustice of global power relations. Th e fact that even human rights can be instrumentalised is the central tenet of critical theories of law. At the global level, too, it is clear that this poses a virulent risk: the economic instrumentalisation of human rights is particularly evident in the lending policies of the IMF and the World Bank. In the main, the buzzwords "human rights" and "good governance" denote a particular borrower's economic policy orientation: the protection of liberal human rights, the investors' property rights, and the patent rights of transnational companies. 29 As well as serving the crystallisation of economic property relations, human rights are also invoked in the context of security policy. Th us, in the case of so-called "humanitarian interventions", we see human rights being re-framed as an interventionary norm. Th e vague nature of human rights allows for " interpretation by special interests" according to their own purposes, while re-interpretations of human rights are employed to legitimise violence.
III. EMANCIPATION THROUGH TR
All of this, however, is just one side of the story. One can also point to the way in which NGOs and other networks are articulating their concerns through the language of human rights and thereby drawing attention to injustice in the transnational public sphere. Th e socialisation of transnational law has nothing to do with a new vein of juridical socialism. It is concerned not with the legal interpretation of socialism, but with interpreting transnational law in a socialist way. In the words of Friedrich Engels and Karl Kautsky, social and democratic demands must be formulated "as legalistic demands within a program". 30 Th e struggle for transnational social rights is able to represent an emancipatory project if we express social claims in the form of legal demands, and, in this spirit, re-interpret and re-organise existing rights.
As far as human rights policy is concerned, the above shows the contradictory and paradoxical way in which the law is hauled back and forth between domination and emancipation. Th is ambivalent quality of law gives rise to a number of warnings. Why should the subalterns turn to the law when it represents 29 David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy's Promise, (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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Intersentia the very tool which guarantees the existing societal order, 31 and which maintains the essential structures that facilitate the re-occurrence of acts of domination?
As far back as the 1920s and 1930s, this was the central question of the critical legal theories emerging from the Frankfurt School. Th e works of Franz L. Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, in particular, off er important insights relating to the transnational constellation. Kirchheimer and Neumann provided devastating portrayals of how law worked and its capacity for instrumentalisation. Both take as their starting point the idea that modern law develops into an autonomous social form. Neumann described the law as being only relatively independent. 32 Law is embedded in social relations. Here, Neumann recognised that the reference to its economic embeddedness is not suffi cient in order to describe the function of law. He saw that the law is related to politics and academia, too. Political, religious and intellectual structures as well as family structure are all realities that aff ect the law, just as the economy does.
Otto Kirchheimer's analyses of juridifi cation similarly address this treatment of law as an autonomous force which is independent of other societal spheres, and meticulously describe the processes of juridifi cation that expand to furthest corners of society:
"In all fi elds of endeavor things are turned into law." 33 Everything is subjected to legal discourse: from administration, the principles of business and economics, worker co-determination and the education system, to issues of family and private life. Discourse theory took on these ideas and interpreted them as the colonising tendencies of functional systems. Th e existing colonisation through law turns all social problems and confl icts into legal questions. 34 World society's most complicated confl icts are given legal hearings, translated into legal terminology and oft en unrecognisably transformed into confl icts of principles; there is no longer any issue of world society that cannot be decided in the language of law, the programme of law and the code of law. Th e key players in this fundamental juridifi cation are the transnationally operating courts, élite lawyers, law fi rms, transnational companies, and NGOs. All are engaged in stabilising societal structures through the legal structure. In extreme cases, fundamental questions are no longer decided in democratically organised forums, but, instead, in an expertocratic way before the world's courts, be it by national Constitutional Courts, regional Courts or the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 35 Kirchheimer was the fi rst to describe the subtle mechanisms of the legal structure in terms of its tendency to subjugate, alienate and determine social relations. His conclusions also off er an important impetus for a transnational legal policy. He did not call for de-juridifi cation, something that would have been too simple as well as unrealistic. He realistically assessed the chances of an alternative legal policy by combining Karl Marx's analyses with a movement towards politicisation. From Marx, he adopted the observation that social relations undergo a diff erentiation, and that one section can follow its self-referential expansionary tendencies to the detriment of other sections of society. Th us, Marx's economic analysis that the economy produces an autonomous commodity form is extended by Kirchheimer to law and legal structure. He combines this Marxist analysis with a critical legal perspective, which reveals the political moment within law's autonomy. He holds in contempt those petty practitioners of the law who believe that law is divorced from politics and that identifying the objective law is a purely scientifi c exercise. He sees legal decisions not as a mathematical calculation, but as the product of legal and political confl icts. If we accept the diagnosis of juridifi cation, it follows that there are consequences for the form that these confl icts take: in the juridifi ed society, they always relate to law and the legal code.
Th rough Kirchheimer, one can demonstrate how the law, which, at fi rst glance, only seems to function in a mechanical and technical way, can -itselfbe internally re-politicised. 36 A considered understanding of transnational social rights requires one to "bring to light power relations" 37 and confront the established and employed techniques of domination; only then can strategies of resistance be identifi ed, invented or strengthened. Since " [t] Intersentia fi rst", 38 the law is a battleground for the "civil war of 'language' with itself". 39 Th is opens the way for world society to re-appropriate the law and allows for the re-socialisation of the juridifi cation process, thus reclaiming the arenas of transnational law from the technocrats.
B. TR ANSNATIONAL JURIDIFICATION
Th is kind of re-appropriation of the law has yet to be achieved. While world society has gone through an intensive juridifi cation, transnational law is predominantly geared towards those interested parties within the functional systems. As far back as 1971, the sociologist Niklas Luhmann put forward the "speculative hypothesis" that law would see a move from normative expectations (politics, morality, law) to cognitive expectations (economy, science, technology):
"At the level of global society, this means that norms (in the form of values, stipulations, goals) will no longer pre-programme recognition patterns; rather, and in stark contrast, the problem of learning adaptation will gain structural primacy, so that the structural conditions for learning within each social system must be supported through normatisation." 40 In other words, the functional systems -primarily the economy -manage to procure everything that they require from world society -including law.
In order to be in a position to suggest eff ective changes, it is important to establish which legal, economic and political factors allowed for the emergence of fi nancial market capitalism -from the watered-down capital requirements of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to the structural adjustment programmes of the IMF. What the public debate on managers' bonus packages overlooks is that the current economic crisis is part of a development that began in the 1970s with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of internationally fi xed exchange rates. Only since then have we witnessed the triumphant march onward of neo-liberalism and the extreme pressure thereby exerted on social rights. In international political economy, this epoch -in which the global economic players provide their own neo-liberal legal norms -will be seen as one of market-liberal constitutionalism. 41 Th e global economic order primarily protects the rights of private industry. Th e path towards this market-liberal dominance was not a straightforward one. Th e global economic crises prior to the Second World War and the failure of the supply-orientated economic doctrine resulted in calls for a socially orientated regulatory system coming even from those who had previously supported the capitalist economic order: the Atlantic Charter drawn up by Roosevelt and Churchill in 1941, the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia of the International Labour Organization, the Charter of the United Nations from 1945, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948, were the fi rst to formulatewith the claim of universal application -the idea of social human rights and an international system geared towards social objectives. 42 Of the many forms of capitalism, the epoch of embedded liberalism in Western nations is distinguished by economic regulation that is demandorientated, and which stimulates growth through public institutions and wage increases. Th is economic appeasement policy is supplemented by corporatist arrangements and social compromises between the bourgeois and the subaltern classes. 43 At international level, this period corresponded with increasing law-making under the framework of the United Nations. Th e Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) , the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966) and the ICESCR (1966) all three emerged in this period. Th e latter bears witness to the fact that the increased signifi cance of social rights on a national scale at the time was also borne out on an international scale. Th e ICESCR secures the right to social security, the right to freedom of association, and the right to strike.
Th e so-called Bretton Woods Institutions exert their infl uence over the sphere of international economic regulation. Th e International Monetary Fund and the World Bank safeguard the system of fi xed exchange rates and, in doing so, rule out -offi cially at least -currency speculation and high-risk fi nancial transactions. 44 Th is model plunged into crisis in the early 1970s, and the system of fi xed exchange rates was abandoned and replaced by a fl oating exchange rate system. 41 Stephen Gill, "Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations", (2002) 
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Only since then has it been possible to speculate on fl uctuating exchange rates, which has since allowed banks to expand their activities in the area of fi nancial and exchange rate speculation.
Neo-liberal economic policy was in line for a change. Th e IMF and the World Bank acquired a new role: ensuring stable conditions for speculation. Th e establishment of the WTO in 1995 provided a legal framework for the liberalisation of world markets. It aimed to contribute to "the substantial reduction of tariff s and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations" (WTO-Agreement).
Th is market-liberal constitutionalism is the product of the one-sided confi guration of a transnational law that legally guarantees the transactions of the global economy. It also involves a de-democratisation of decision-making processes. 45 Th is democratic defi cit mainly arises from the elimination of the public spheres open to democratic participation and the establishment -in their place -of private institutions without democratic legitimacy. Under this new arrangement, corporate freedom and corporate property rights are removed from democratic and public supervision. Th ese neo-liberal norms are bolstered by a system of global jurisdiction, which sees transnational institutions install their own jurisdictions and dispute resolution procedures, such as the WTO arbitration procedure.
Th is leads to legal mechanisms that are diffi cult to change, and whose market-liberal viewpoint excludes alternative paths of politico-economic development. Instead of being subject to democratic decision-making processes, the economic and societal order is safeguarded by a less than transparent process of juridifi cation hatched in the back rooms of international diplomacy and corporations.
While the winners in the global economy have long taken control of the legal machinery and thus created the perfect conditions for their own interests to fl ourish, attempts to introduce a sense of social and environmental responsibility to the system remain all too rare. As yet, there have been no radical changes in thinking on the scale necessary to bring about a lasting socialisation of neoliberal excesses.
If the diagnosis is correct that the process of globalisation has given free rein to the economic system, it seems fl awed to expect the remedy to come from a kind of national résistance. We would be better advised to pinpoint elements of an alternative juridico-political approach that have the potential to re-arrange the unfettered transnational system in a social and ecological way.
Two examples demonstrate the need to extend the fi ght for social rights beyond the constraints of the nation state: Th e resolution made fairly plain reference to the simmering confl ict around the Brazilian AIDS programme, and served as a diplomatic barometer for the pressure mounting against the US government. Th is explains why, on the fi rst day of the UN's special session, the US announced that it was withdrawing the WTO complaint in favour of negotiations with Brazil. From a US perspective, the proceedings also had a counter-productive eff ect within the WTO system, as it led to the so-called Doha Compromise (2001), which provided for exceptions from WTO obligations for developing countries.
Th e Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Bolivia and the Right to Water
Another example is provided by the protests by residents of the Bolivian town of Cochabamba against high water prices and poor water quality following the privatisation of the water supply. Public pressure eventually led to the Intersentia government reversing the privatisation, to wit, re-nationalising the "public" utility. Th is prompted the company in question, Aguas del Tunari, a subsidiary of the US fi rm Bechtel, to bring the Bolivian government before the ICSID in an attempt to force them to uphold the contracts. 46 Th e case posed the fundamental question of whether the property rights of Aguas del Tunari could trump the rights to food, to freely enjoy natural resources, and to one's own means of subsistence as guaranteed by the ICESCR. Civil societal pressure which pitted property rights against social counter-rights led to an out-of-court settlement, and exposed the contradiction of world society. Th is is much more than a collision between national regulation and the norms of globalisation. At heart, the confl ict represents the tension between profi t-driven private business and access to public goods. Th is tension, prevalent in national law, is also evident in transnational law, as two diff erent normative regimes collide -WTO law and the law of the ICESCR. What happened aft er the ICSID proceedings reveals the socio-structural confl ict at play. Not only were Bolivia's water laws amended, but its new 2009 Constitution also guarantees the right to access to water and stipulates that access to water may not be the object of concession or privatisation. It shows that intervention was required to prevent democratic and social rights from being trounced by global norms, and demonstrates how successful civil-society protests can be.
IV. TR ANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS
Th e category of transnational social rights unites three strands of rights that have been separated in conventional legal discourse. Transnational social rights combine liberal, social and political human rights. Th e fact that these rights would be amalgamated in this way is far from self-evident, due to a pervasive tendency to treat liberal human rights and social rights as two distinct categories, and, in turn, to separate both groups from the category of democratic rights. Liberalism has been particularly eff ective at giving priority to liberal human rights at the expense of political and social interests. Over time, this has weakened social rights and prevented them from achieving their democratic potential.
A. THE INDIVISIBILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Initially, social and liberal human rights were conceived of as one. Th is is evident from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948, which refl ected the prevailing conceptions of rights immediately aft er World War II. Along with the usual liberal rights, such as freedom of expression, the prohibition of torture and the right to bodily integrity and eff ective legal protection, it also included social rights, such as the right to social protection, work, health and food, within the catalogue of human rights. A tendency to separate these categories of rights emerged with the adoption of the two international covenants in the 1960s, wherein social rights are textually split from liberal human rights: the ICCPR ratifi ed by 168 states, and the ICESCR with 164 parties. Th is division is echoed at European level. While the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) focuses on liberal human rights, social rights are relegated to the European Social Charter.
Th e main result of this division was that the two categories of rights were not made equally enforceable. Th e liberal human rights are safeguarded by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), while the social rights are protected only by a committee, which does not even have the power to hear individual complaints. Finally, some attempts are under way to introduce a complaint mechanism into the context of the ICESCR. An optional protocol to this eff ect was drawn up by the General Assembly in 2008 and entered into force in May 2013. 47 Since then, those whose rights have been violated are able to make a submission to the Committee, which can then make the appropriate recommendations to the state in question.
Th e separate institutional handling of the two categories of rights shows that, while liberal human rights are conceived of as "hard" actionable rights, social rights are oft en reduced to the status of non-actionable "non-rights", which robs them of their normative clout.
Slowly, however, the debate is picking up speed. Th e 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights made a signifi cant contribution to the idea of the indivisibility of human rights. Many states ratifi ed both UN Covenants in the wake of the conference. Th e current status of ratifi cations indicates that liberal and political human rights and social human rights can claim to be valid right across cultural boundaries. Both the Vienna Declaration -adopted at the end of the Vienna Conference in June 1993 -and the United Nations Millennium Declaration explicitly stress the indivisibility of human rights, with the Millennium Declaration going so far as to set out the goal, in paragraph 19, "[t]o halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world's people whose income is less than one dollar a day and the proportion of people who suff er from hunger".
Th e concepts of the indivisibility of human rights and the inter-dependence of liberal, political and social rights are now once again fi nding favour. Th is Th is typology of human rights is therefore not limited to liberal rights; instead, it can be thought of as being three-dimensional. Th e (liberal) human rights of the fi rst dimension include defensive and freedom-orientated rights, such as the right to life and to personal freedom. Th e (social) rights constituting the second dimension are, to a large extent, codifi ed in the ICESCR. 48 Th ese are joined by the third group of rights to political participation and collective rights, such as the rights to development, peace, solidarity and the right to share in the common heritage of mankind. 49 Th ese three dimensions are diff erent forms of human rights. Th ey are interwoven with one another and cannot be categorically divided. Only together can they fulfi l their purpose: namely, to enable individual and collective self-constitution.
Other recent codifi cations of fundamental and human rights re-inforce this conception of indivisible human rights. Th e Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU -which became incorporated into primary law following the Treaty of Lisbon -encompasses social as well as liberal rights. Th e same is true for the Banjul Charter of the African Union and the American Convention on Human Rights. Specialised agreements such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities include both liberal and social rights.
Even where there is no such immediately apparent merging of social and liberal rights, the categorical separation of the groups cannot be maintained; the two sets of rights are mutually dependent. Th e liberal rights have a social dimension, and the social rights have a liberal dimension. Th e social right to health is not limited to basic claims to health-care -it includes liberty rights which protect the individual against state interference. Relevant state interference could consist of permitting the use of dangerous technologies or breaches of bodily integrity through irreversible surgical measures carried out on intersexual children. Th e liberal right to free choice of employment brings with it the obligation to provide for fair and reasonable allocation of jobs. Liberal property rights can give rise to social security entitlements, while the right to human dignity combined with the principle of social justice and the welfare state leads to an entitlement to the guarantee of the socio-cultural basic income. Similarly, there is no clear delineation between political and social human rights. Th e fundamental right to worker co-determination, for example, is derived from human dignity, general personality rights and the free choice of profession. Th ese liberal rights give rise to an employee's entitlement to contribute to the governing of his or her own professional environment. Th e fundamental right to co-determination is therefore not only a social right which is derived from liberal rights, but is also a political right since it establishes the entitlement to democratic participation in business life. Th e sociologist Th omas H. Marshall pointed out that the social right to freedom of association, for example, also counts as one of the political participation rights that transfer the status as citizen into the industrial sphere, giving rise to the notion of industrial citizenship. 50 Major features of industrial democracy arose through the interpretation of liberal and social human rights.
While the principle of transnational social rights puts emphasis on a combined approach to liberal, political and social human rights, it is possible to identify fi ve distinct kinds of social rights within this approach: 51 1. liberal human rights with a social component (e.g., free choice of profession) and social human rights with a liberal component (e.g., the right to health); 2. political human rights with a social component (e.g., the right to co-determination) and social human rights with a political component (e.g., the right to strike); 3. equality rights which provide social entitlements to inclusion; 4. rights to social security, which can range from social support to health and environmental protection; and 5. social objectives, such as the goals of social progress and international peace set out in the preamble of the UN Charter.
All of the fi ve elements of this typology have the potential to establish subjective entitlements, i.e., individual social rights that can be enforced in courts. Th e discovery that social rights exist in current international law leads us directly to the most important point of debate: What are the required conditions to turn subjective rights into concrete enforceable entitlements?
B. OBJECTIONS
Conservative lawyers argue against unlocking the potential of transnational social rights for a number of reasons. Four main objections are generally presented. See, also, the typology used by Karl-Jürgen Bieback, in "Soziale Rechte", (2010) 43 Kritische Justiz, p. 230 et seq.
Intersentia
Vagueness
It is oft en claimed that social rights are too vague and too ill-defi ned to establish concrete rights and duties. Th is was the approach taken, for example, by a German administrative court in refusing to recognise the substantive content of a number of norms from the ICESCR. Students who tried to rely on the Covenant to fi ght against university fees in Nordrhein-Westfalen in Germany in 2007 were blocked from doing so by the court, which stated:
"the text of the treaty … lacks the necessary exactness for a legal norm … Th e normal requirements of certainty and precision relating to international treaties cannot be applied here. Due to its political nature and its character as the product of diplomatic compromise, the law of international treaties is oft en vaguely worded, and occasionally not at all intended to regulate a real life situation, but instead deliberately uses language to cover up the fact that precisely nothing is, in fact, meant to be regulated." 52
Th is attempt to erode social rights was subsequently rejected by a higher court, which recognised in its decision that the ICESCR can indeed establish norms and is not merely a political declaration of will. 53 Th is makes it clear that "vagueness" is, in itself, a vague criterion. All legal norms are vague. Th e central task of the law is to convert inexactness into exactness, in other words, to determine indeterminable issues. Th e uncertainty of the law is the starting-point for every legal dispute, which involves pitting two competing interpretations of the law against each other to see which will prevail. Legal norms, particularly humanrights norms, are always in need of concretisation. Take, for example, the fi rst provision of the German Basic Law: " Human dignity shall be inviolable." Th is provision is no less in need of concretisation than the social ICESCR-guaranteed right at stake in the case of the university fees, which states that:
"with a view to achieving the full realization of this right [to education] … [h] igher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education."
Progressive Realisation
Social rights are oft en guaranteed only on condition of feasibility. to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures". Th e fact that social rights are to be progressively realised does not mean, however, that it is impossible to substantiate these rights. Th e Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the monitoring body of the ICESCR, thus diff erentiates between the obligations of states to respect, to protect and to fulfi l rights. It argues that progressive realisation, as set out in Article 2 (1) of the Convention, is proof that the Convention represents more than a non-binding list of aims. As Eibe Riedel correctly notes, Article 2 (1) of the Covenant "places an unequivocal legally-binding duty on all State Parties, the intensity of which is balanced against the objective situation in which State Parties fi nd themselves". 54 Th is duty can establish a prohibition on retrogressive measures, for example, the prohibition on the introduction of university fees, but can also lead to a duty to improve the situation progressively, which could entail a duty to abolish such fees gradually.
Resource Dependence
Th e argument based upon the resource-dependent nature of social rights and the need for democratic decisions on the distribution of limited resources has had a signifi cant infl uence on international law practice. It is indeed the main reason for the reluctance on the part of states when it comes to establishing monitoring bodies for the enforcement of social rights. Th is approach disregards, however, that political and liberal human rights also depend on resources. Th is is all the more true if the right requires legal mechanisms to be set up. Th e establishment of the system of patent protection in order to uphold liberal property rights, for example, entails signifi cant costs. Th e World Bank estimates the costs of enforcing a WTO-compliant intellectual property right in developing countries at around 1.5 million to 2 million USD per country and warns that:
"Given other pressing needs in education, health, and policy reform, it is questionable whether the least-developed countries would be willing to absorb these costs, or indeed whether they would achieve much social payoff from investing in them. Moreover, note that poor countries are extremely scarce in trained administrators and judges, suggesting that one of the largest costs would be to divert scarce professional and technical resources out of potentially more productive activities. 
Intersentia
Th ere is a further fl aw in the argument that the actionability of social rights would lead to immense costs, in that there are lots of social rights that do not lead to an entitlement to services. Th ey oft en have more in common with classic defensive rights. If the right to water is violated by environmental pollution, what is required is not some cost-intensive service, but, instead, a mere omission, just as with liberal rights. And where social rights do give rise to entitlements, granting these entitlements does not necessarily result in a burden on state fi nances. Th e fair distribution of available natural resources such as land and water, the recognition of the traditional usage rights of indigenous peoples or other local communities, or the permission to produce generic medicines despite existing patents, all represent rights that do not entail increased costs to the state. Th e actionability of social rights does not mean that the court will never take fi nancial considerations into account -quite the opposite. Th is is why the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights leaves a certain amount of discretion when it comes to the allocation of resources. Th e burden of proof rests on the state if it cites "resource constraints" as an explanation for its failure to fulfi l its obligations. In practice, the Committee applies the following criteria to the legality of any retrogressive steps taken by a state: the country's level of development, the severity of the alleged breach of rights, the country's current economic situation, and the existence of other serious claims on the state party's limited resources; for example, resulting from a recent natural disaster or from recent internal or international armed confl ict. 56
Judicial Enforceability
Th e fi nal objection to social rights holds that, for structural reasons, it is generally not feasible to conceive of social fundamental rights in the same way as directly enforceable rights, such as liberty rights. 57 Th is argument challenges the justiciability of social rights as such, and generally takes one of two forms. Th e fi rst one voices doubts about the applicability of such a right, and questions whether the norm has the structural capacity to oblige the addressee to take a particular course of action. Th e second one posits that such rights represent a duty imposed by international law that is binding on states, but that this does not empower an individual to have recourse to international law in order to claim the right. Both points are important fi elds of legal and political debate in the battle to determine whether norms may be enforced or whether these provisions will be rendered toothless. A look at the European Social Charter demonstrates the fate that awaits social rights when this battle is not fought to the end. For example, the Charter guarantees the right to strike, a right not limited to union-led wage-based strikes. Th e German approach, which forbids so-called "political strikes", therefore represents a breach of the Charter. German courts, however, have been reluctant to apply the Charter, despite the fact that Germany has ratifi ed it. Th e reason given for this reluctance is that the Charter's provisions are to be seen as aims that all state parties should strive to achieve. Th e prevailing legal opinion in Germany maintains that the word "aims" implies that the Charter is not intended to establish subjective rights.
Th ere is good reason to reject this approach, a view shared by the European Committee of Social Rights, the treaty's monitoring body. 58 Th e EU Charter of Fundamental Rights presents a similar situation. Th is Charter introduced a diff erentiation between "'real' rights" and "principles". Th e offi cial clarifi cation given is that "'real' rights" are to be treated as "subjective rights", while "principles" need only to be generally observed. Here, in the small print, we see another attempt to weaken social rights -the principles are largely made up of social rights -by framing them in terms of vague concepts, instead of actionable rights. 59 Th e enforceability question is also debated with reference to the justiciability of these rights in international forums. As mentioned, states have, to date, been extremely reluctant to allow for individual or collective complaint procedures before both the ICESCR and the European Social Charter. In both cases, the legal and political debate must focus on working towards strengthening these rights. Th ere is nothing in the structure of social, liberal or social-liberal rights that can justify the diff erent way in which these norms are treated.
Th ere is no principled distinction between social human rights and liberal/ political human rights. Nor are social rights any less binding. Transnational social rights are equal to, overlap, and cannot be divided from, liberal and political rights. Without the right to self-constitution, i.e., the right to a guaranteed basic income, and without the rights to environmental protection and migration, political and liberal human rights would be rendered hollow.
Liberal and political human rights cannot adequately deal with the problems of people living in refugee camps or people who have lost their livelihoods due to environmental disasters. Social rights are thus a necessary addition to -and not the opposite of -liberal and political rights. All three dimensions rely upon 58 Tino Frieling and Roland Czycholl, "Auswirkungen der Europäischen Sozialcharta auf das Arbeitskampfrecht. Das Streikrecht aus Art. 6 Abs. 4 ESC als vorrangige gesetzgeberische Entscheidung", (2011) Zeitschrift für europäisches Sozial-und Arbeitsrecht, p. 322 et seq. each other. Th ey are indivisible. Th e co-originality of political, liberal and social rights is essential for the self-determination of individuals. 60 Th is indivisibility also means that there are no rights without social rights. Transnational law is social, or it isn't law at all.
V. ARENAS OF TR ANSNATIONAL LEGAL POLICY
Th ere are three diff erent arenas where transnational social rights must be strengthened: (A) at global level, the main challenge is to fi nd a timely solution to the threats to social rights posed, not by states, but by transnational corporations. At European level (B), we have to make sure that a social Europe becomes a reality. Th is is of utmost importance with regard to the strengthening of transnational social rights: a social union which resists the temptation to establish imperial and exploitative (transnational) relations, could be a powerful resource which promotes social rights. Lastly, we must ensure that (C) states and the political organisations of global governance are held to the standard of the emancipatory ideal.
A. TR ANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS AND TR ANSNATIONAL COR POR ATIONS
A crucial element of contemporary legal policy is to ensure that transnational corporations are bound to respect social human rights. 61 Th e fact that Deutsche Bank can, on the one hand, speculate on crop failures, food scarcities and hunger-related deaths while, on the other, it can issue enthusiastic declarations relating to the UN Global Compact Initiative on upholding human rights is evidence of the complexities of transnational legal policy. How can private companies be bound to uphold transnational social rights? How can the concept of human rights for corporations move from being a mere marketing instrument to becoming actionable legal obligations? We urgently need to fi nd answers to the new kinds of risks that social rights face not from global politics, but from transnational corporations.
But what obligations -if any -does international law impose on transnational corporations? For decades, the steadfast position was that international law is a legal order both for and by states. Th e authors and addressees of this law were therefore states, and not individuals or corporate entities. business, science and technology, all raise the question of how international law -and particularly human rights -respond to these all-encompassing processes of transnationalisation. As far back as 1934, Hans Kelsen recognised that: "[t] o the extent that international law penetrates areas that heretofore have been the exclusive domain of national legal orders, its tendency toward directly authorizing and obligating individuals must increase." 62 Calls for direct obligations to be placed on non-state actors are still, however, met with stiff resistance. It is extremely diffi cult for the victims of violations of transnational social rights to have their rights enforced. Th is is made shockingly clear in the case of violations of social human rights relating to the right to food. Oil drilling in the Niger Delta has caused extensive environmental pollution. Consortia of transnational corporations headed by the British/Dutch oil company Shell have devastated huge tracts of land, collaborated in the execution of human-rights lawyer Ken Saro-Wiwa and his supporters, and violated the social rights of the Ogoni people. In 2011, the United Nations Environment Programme published an extensive report detailing the contamination caused by oil exploration and production in the Ogoniland of Nigeria. 63 Th e oil drilling is a violation of the right to food as well as the collective right to the protection of the natural environment. Th is protection is one of the key concerns -indeed, the core ecological demand -of transnational social rights. Th is is due to the fact that environmental rights are rights that are closely linked to human rights. Courts oft en read ecological concerns into liberal and social human rights, a phenomenon known as the "environmentalisation of human rights". In this way, the European Court of Human Rights has developed the environmental components of the European Convention on Human Rights based upon the right to life and the right to privacy. Similarly, the UN Human Rights Committee interprets the ICCPR in such a way as to include ecological human rights.
Th e environmental leaning is particularly important when it comes to social human rights. Th e right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate nutrition, clothing, accommodation and health, contained in the ICESCR also encompasses the right to stable environmental conditions to enable human existence. Th e UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights thus found that these two norms could be read as establishing a right to water. 64 All of these fundamental norms are directed, in the traditional way, at states. Th ese rights impose three legal obligations on states: (1) the duty to respect Intersentia obliges all states to refrain from violating these rights; (2) the duty to protect obliges all states to protect against violations of these rights by third parties; and (3) the duty to fulfi l obliges states to ensure that these rights are enforced, which includes their taking active measures to do so.
However, this triad of duties cannot directly impose any obligations on the transnational corporation Shell. Th e powerlessness of transnational law when it comes to the human rights obligations of transnational corporations is evidenced by the fact that, to date, there has been no fi nal court judgment against Shell. Th e proceedings in the Netherlands are still ongoing, as Shell has appealed against a judgment of the District Court of Th e Hague which granted compensation to the victims. 65 Th e jurisdiction of national courts also presents problems, as this requires a legal connection to the state in which the court is sitting, i.e., that the corporation, the victim, or the place in which the crime was committed has a connection to the state in question. Th is is oft en diffi cult to achieve in the case of human rights violations. A certain amount of legal creativity is required if, for example, a Nigerian victim of a crime that took place in Nigeria wishes to take a foreign subsidiary of a transnational corporation to court. Th e US legal system off ers quite a lot of scope in cases such as these. In the US, corporations involved in grave violations of human rights may be brought before courts even if there is no immediate connection between the violation and the US. It was for this reason that lawyers taking a case relating to the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa initiated proceedings before a New York court. When, in June 2009, the court declared the compensation claim admissible, Shell agreed to a settlement with the victims in the region of 15 million USD. 66 Apart from this case, which made use of the opportunity presented by the US legal system, there is little scope at global level to seek a judgment against Shell.
Judgment on the issue has been handed down only to the state of Nigeria, in a case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights relating to violations of the right to food. In its decision, the Commission stressed the importance of the right to food in the human rights system, fi nding that:
"the minimum core of the right to food requires that the Nigerian Government should not destroy or contaminate food sources.
[…] Th e Government has destroyed food sources through its security forces and State Oil Company; has allowed private oil companies to destroy food sources; and, through terror, has created signifi cant obstacles to Ogoni communities trying to feed themselves." 67 But what concrete human rights obligations exist for transnational corporations?
Th us far, attempts have failed to formulate a draft on the responsibility of corporations under international law and on a declaration of a code of social responsibility with universal applicability and direct eff ect. 68 Currently, the concept of voluntary codes does have some traction. While these voluntary declarations are problematical, they do at least represent a start. One should not be too quick to reject categorically the legal applicability of such declarations just because they are voluntary in nature. Law is not limited to what states, themselves, set out. Legal norms can also be formed in society. To see the concept of law as being too closely linked to the state is to overlook the unique nature of social norms.
Th e struggle for law has always entailed debate on the signifi cance of certain symbolic texts. Even the idea that the constitution could have a binding eff ect on politics was established only aft er a legal debate. Even the Magna Carta was not initially conceived of as a justiciable document.
In a similar way, transnational social and democratic legal policy will have to work to transform these voluntary declarations into binding transnational social rights. Th e future obligations on transnational corporations to uphold human rights might take a multi-dimensional form, encompassing binding fundamental rules, incentives and voluntary initiatives. Th ere is certainly no shortage of initiatives to create such norms. Th e following initiatives are of particular importance: (1) Th e United Nations Global Compact (UNGC): a public-private initiative of the UN, which aims to establish ten universal principles, including that business should respect the protection of human rights. (2) In May 2010, the UNGC came to an agreement with the Global Reporting Initiative to monitor the ten principles by means of the "G3 Guidelines". Th is will, for the fi rst time, provide guidelines for a monitoring mechanism. (3) Th e International Organization for Standardization (ISO) should also be mentioned in this context. In May 2010, it adopted the draft ISO 26000 on Social Responsibility. Th is ISO norm makes a signifi cant contribution to the standardisation of the human rights obligations of companies. A common feature of all these eff orts is that they are stated in terms of recommendations, attempts to standardise, or voluntary commitments, and thus are not declared as law in a formal sense. Th is does not, however, exclude the possibility that the legal character of these rules can emerge as a result of the struggle to determine their substance. 69 Th e legally binding nature of these rules may also emerge with the help of national law. A common litigation strategy of transnational lawyer groups is to hold companies accountable to their Codes of Conduct. Voluntary standards can oft en be enforced in accordance with competition or consumer laws, where they include relevant representations to the consumer. Th us, a corporation's non-adherence to its own codes can be enforced before courts in the country of the corporation's headquarters.
Th ese are the tentative fi rst steps in the attempt to "get serious" about the human rights obligations of transnational corporations. Transnational social rights that place obligations on corporations can develop out of the complex interplay between various state and non-state systems. In his report from 2008/2009, John Ruggie, the former UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, referred to precisely this multidimensional aspect. Ruggie sees complementary responsibilities in terms of human rights, and categorises these interconnected duties into a three-pillar system. His "protect, respect and remedy" framework encompasses, apart from the state duty to protect against human rights violations, a corporate responsibility to respect human rights, i.e., a direct duty, aimed at corporations, to act with due diligence to avoid infringing upon the rights of others. Added to this is the right of access to judicial and non-judicial remedies. Th us, alongside the traditional state obligations, he sets out a distinct corporate responsibility, which he says has acquired near-universal recognition. He states:
"By near-universal is meant two things. First, the corporate responsibility to respect is acknowledged by virtually every company and industry CSR initiative, endorsed by the world's largest business associations, affi rmed in the Global Compact and its worldwide national networks, and enshrined in such soft law instruments as the ILO Tripartite Declaration and the OECD Guidelines. Second, violations of this social norm are routinely brought to public attention globally through mobilized local communities, networks of civil society, the media including blogs, complaints procedures such as the OECD NCPs […] Th is transnational normative regime reaches not only Western multinationals, which have long experienced its eff ects, but also emerging economy companies operating abroad, and even large national fi rms." 70 Ruggie goes into more detail on this corporate responsibility in his fi nal report of 2011, in which duties to adhere to certain due diligence standards are placed on corporations in order to guarantee human rights. 71 Ruggie's work has, however, been criticised for not going far enough. Indeed, eff orts must be made, particularly in the area of social rights, to ensure that it is not just defensive rights that exist against transnational corporations, but that corporations can also be obliged to take certain positive steps. 72 In the abovementioned example of patents for medicines, it is easy to imagine situations in which the patent holder could be obliged to allow for the production of generic drugs or be obliged to make lifesaving medicines available.
What does this mean for the enforcement of transnational social rights regarding corporations? It is clear that defensive as well as positive rights should be demanded from corporations. Political human rights should also be developed in the same way so that the idea of participation can be applied against corporations as well. Th e Aarhus Convention set up innovative participation and control structures in relation to corporations and environmental issues. Strengthening the rules on co-determination in transnational corporations thus remains a central task.
In all of these areas, it is essential to open up access to judicial avenues. Th e Ruggie report sets out the right to greater access to eff ective judicial and non-judicial remedies for victims, and refers to the UN General Assembly's "Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law". Th e General Assembly declared that these principles emanate from customary international law. Th e question remains, however, as to whether or not public international law as it currently stands provides for a duty to compensate. If rights violations can be attributed to a corporation, are they obliged to compensate the victims? Conservative international lawyers fl atly deny the existence of any individual right to compensation under international law. Yet there is no settled prevailing opinion on the matter. A further question relates to which transnational social rights are included in these basic principles and guidelines, i.e., whether the latter apply only to "gross violations" of human rights. Restrictive answers to this question refer to the draft ing history of the principles. During negotiations, the term "gross violations" was understood as referring only to crimes in the category of genocide and slavery. But states decided against such a narrow interpretation. Instead, it was made clear that systematic violations would also trigger the legal obligation to provide compensation. Th e task here is to ensure that as many kinds of violations as possible are included in this system of compensation.
Of more fundamental importance, however, is the dispute over whether the right to the legal proceedings and compensation set out by Ruggie also applies in cases of the violations of rights by private persons and corporations. Here again, the restrictive view argues that the principles are directed solely at states. Th is claim is not, however, supported by the wording of the principles, which stipulate the duty to:
"Provide those who claim to be victims of a human rights or humanitarian law violation with equal and eff ective access to justice, as described below, irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for the violation." 73 It is certainly possible that even those violations of transnational social rights that are caused by private parties could trigger a claim to an adequate, eff ective and prompt remedy. In short, based upon these principles and guidelines, it is possible to extrapolate from the existing law an obligation on corporations to compensate victims where the former have violated transnational social rights.
B. THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL UNION
Th e European Union is a forceful example for a transnational polity that is highly juridifi ed and even vested with parliamentary institutions. Th is aff ects not only the European continent. Th e EU and the Eurozone is an integrated market that establishes relations of economic exchange to the rest of the world. And, in international institutions such as the WTO, the EU acts as a unitary polity. For the strengthening of transnational social rights, it is absolutely crucial that such regional actors promote social rights instead of echoing the market-liberal and imperial dominance that we have already pointed out. Th is is why the quest for a social Europe attains a huge importance with regard to the overall project.
Not least, the turn towards austerity policies that the Union has seen in the last years is an important example in order to elucidate the devastating eff ects of neglecting social rights: the social and democratic defi cit of the EU is one of the main reasons why the European competitive order is increasingly plagued by crisis. Th ere is no economic stability without social stability. Financialisation and massive wage restraint have led to economic imbalances. Th e riots and unrest that we have seen spreading through Europe over the last years are a reaction to these imbalances, which leave many Europeans with no prospects. In the Parisian banlieues, young people, in particular, are protesting against social stigmatisation, while, in the latest occupations at Puerta del Sol in Madrid, welleducated students and graduates are drawing attention to their lack of prospects and demanding a democracia real. Th ey call for "a Europe of the citizens and not of the markets. We are not commodities in the hands of politicians and bankers". 74 Th e lack of European harmonisation in social and economic policies has exacerbated the crisis. Th e increasingly precarious job markets play a central role here. Minimum social standards have been lowered while the low-wage sector and atypical forms of employment fl ourish. Even beyond socio-political considerations, the urgent question now is whether or not a social union which protects minimum wages and income can be established, which could, in turn, help to prevent future imbalances. To date, a Europeanisation of social rights is diffi cult to discern. In contrast, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, the European Commission and of most of the Member States is agreed that Europe is principally a sphere of economic competition, not a sphere of social justice.
But the crisis in the European competitive order extends beyond the socio-economic dimension in that it is closely linked to the crisis of European democracy. Th e latter arises out of a growing sense of alienation between the majority of EU citizens and the political and economic élite.
Th is is also refl ected in the EU's approach to international trade policies and regional co-operation. While it tries to establish free-trade agreements with the US and Canada, it is not willing to implement fair trade, based upon asymmetrical trade relations, with the Global South. 75 It still echoes the chants of free trade. And not least of all, it attempts to shield its borders against refugees by implementing new police and security apparatuses. Clearly, the current state of the Union is neither committed to social rights nor to an awareness of Europe's colonial past.
As the EU's situation intensifi es, the question must be asked: Will the EU deepen its market-liberal constitution and set up increasingly authoritarian means of regulation, or will it face the crisis by prioritising social rights, democracy and economic re-distribution?
A European social union can only be achieved if we make a great eff ort to transform the market-liberal legal structure into one that guarantees democratic and social rights. Th is will require institutional reforms as well as pressure from civil society.
Two issues could be of particular signifi cance when it comes to the Europeanisation of social rights. Th e strengthening of the European Social 74 See www.democracyrealya.es.
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Intersentia
Charter and the establishment of a "social" EU citizenship by means of a minimum income system.
1. Th e strengthening of the European Social Charter and the establishment of a European court of social rights could act as a counter development to marketliberal single market integration. With the adoption of the Social Charter, the majority of the Council of Europe agreed on a catalogue of social rights, precisely those social rights that the European Court of Justice categorises as being subordinate to economic fundamental freedoms: the rights to strike and to demonstrate, and the right to collective bargaining.
In a whole series of judgments from the 1970s and 1980s onwards, the ECJ developed a market-liberal leaning. Recent examples of this tendency can be found in the Court's jurisprudence in the decisions in the Laval, Viking, Luxembourg and Rüff ert cases. 76 In the Laval and Viking cases, the Court found that strike and protest actions against wage dumping represented violations of fundamental freedoms. In the matter of Luxembourg, the ECJ found Luxembourg's laws protecting workers were not in conformity with EU law. Th e decision in the Rüff ert case found that, when awarding contracts, the German state of Lower Saxony was not permitted to set minimum wage limits.
In each of these cases, the Court asserted that the four economic freedoms of the single market -the free movement of goods, people, services and capitalare more important than collective bargaining autonomy and the right of trade unions to strike. It seems that the eff et utile of European law has long become an eff et néolibéral, which cossets the European competitive order against calls for social justice. 77 While the European Charter of Fundamental Rights has become binding with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, it remains unlikely that the ECJ will revise its single market leaning at any time in the near future. Th ere is nothing to suggest that this might change signifi cantly in the near future. Th e outlook is all the more gloomy given that the social rights set out in the Charter are largely categorised as "principles", thus deliberately rendering the enforceability of such rights uncertain.
It would be a real breakthrough for social rights in Europe if the EU itself were obliged to adhere to the European Social Charter, given that the Charter is an international treaty that forms part of the law of the European Council and has been signed and ratifi ed by 27 European states (but not by all the EU Member States). As it currently stands, the treaty is of meagre signifi cance. Apart from the required ratifi cation, there is no reason why the rights contained in the Charter could not be relied upon in court or invoked to establish an individual or collective complaint procedure. Th e EU should sign up to the European Social Charter, a move which would signifi cantly bolster the Charter's status. A judicial forum under the framework of the Charter -a "European Court of Social Rights" -could supplement the network of existing European courts. Such a court could be established in complementarity to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Alternatively, the monitoring of the Social Charter could be entrusted to the Strasbourg court. Both approaches would fulfi l the same purpose: there is a need for a court which -unlike the ECJ/CJEU -does not give priority to upholding the principles of the single market, but, instead, aims to ensure that social rights fi nally become a central concern in Europe. Th is is not about legal chicaneries or jurisdiction tricks; it is simply a question of where and how the collision between social democracy and market-liberal economy can be articulated by law, but without priority rules automatically relegating social guarantees to the status of second-class rights.
2. If the observation is correct that securing a minimum standard of subsistence is crucial for inclusion and democratic participation, then this brings with it direct consequences for a socio-legal policy in Europe. Th e goal is to establish a social EU citizenship by way of a nuanced system of guaranteed basic income. Precarity and a lack of prospects have an exacerbating eff ect on Europe's crises: wage levels and purchasing power plummet while fi nancial insecurity makes it more diffi cult for people to participate in democratic processes or to have a hand in shaping the future. Th e sociologist Pierre Bourdieu thus found that such increasingly precarious conditions gave rise to a new form of domination. 78 Th e right to a basic income could represent an important antidote to the fundamental insecurity felt by people in Europe. In this vein, the Committee on Employment and Social Aff airs of the EU Parliament called on the Member States to provide for minimum-income schemes in order to "prevent poverty and social exclusion". 79 In the report, the Committee fi nds that "social assistance in most Member States is already below a level which makes poverty a risk", i.e., under 60 per cent of the national average income. Th us, the Committee calls for a diff erentiated minimum income for everyone in Europe based upon the income levels of the particular state. Th is social security system should guarantee a minimum income, while minimum wages should be introduced to combat wage dumping. Th e call for a minimum income is thus framed in terms of a fundamental entitlement. Th e system would not represent charitable hand-outs, but would, 78 Pierre Bourdieu, "Prekarität ist überall" (Precarity is everywhere), in: idem, Gegenfeuer. Wortmeldungen im Dienste des Widerstands gegen die neoliberale Invasion, (Konstanz: UVK, 1998), p. 96 et seq. Intersentia instead, ground actionable legal claims. Th e demand for a legally-enforceable minimum income in accordance with the economic situation of each country could inject new energy into the struggle for social rights in the European Union. 80 Th e European Court of Justice, in a series of decisions on single-market integration and cross-border mobility, has found that all EU citizens -regardless of their nationality -should have access to social entitlements in their country of residence. 81 Th is lays the foundations for a form of EU citizenship, which would need to be attuned accordingly in a system of minimum income and expanded to include minimum wages and economic participation. We must aim to create a social EU citizenship that entails more than just cross-border mobility and antidiscrimination rights. Th is would guarantee a minimum level of subsistence, which could form the basis for further calls for co-determination rights and economic democratisation.
C. INSTITUTIONS OF TR ANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS
Th e question remains: In which forums can transnational social rights be enforced? Th e answer depends on whether the aim is of national, regional or worldwide enforceability.
National infrastructure has an important role to play in the enforceability of transnational social rights. It is not just the US legal system that allows for fundamental human rights to be enforced in a de-centralised manner -i.e., before national courts. Th rough "role splitting", 82 national court decisions can write transnational legal history. National courts represent more than just an important addition to international institutions; they can -in themselves -drive the enforcement and strengthening of transnational social rights. In the Pinochet case, for instance, Spanish and British courts made a signifi cant contribution to the protection against the arbitrary use of state power. In numerous cases, US courts -against the interests of US foreign policy -are playing a leading role in the enforcement of transnational law.
Th e existing regional and global forums for the protection of human rights must also be strengthened. Th is applies, fi rst and foremost, to judicial practice. Here, pressure must be applied to ensure that national courts are obliged to take the statements of these and similar bodies into account. Th e organs of the International Labour Organization that monitor observance of core labour standards must be strengthened, as must the complaint procedure of the OECD relating to adherence to the OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises.
Non-state actors must, to a greater degree, be brought into the system of global jurisdiction. Transnational corporations as well as international organisations such as the United Nations and NATO must be subjected to the jurisdiction of human-rights forums. Th e same is true for transnational corporations.
VI. THE POLEMICS OF TR ANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS
Th e right to a minimum basic income, participation rights, the right to an undamaged environment, and the right to freedom of movement: all of these refer to the law of world society as we know it, while simultaneously suggesting an alternative. Th e promise of transnational social rights lies not in an elaborate blueprint for a better world order; instead, it is confi ned, at least for the moment, to the modest demand of allowing the inherent contradiction(s) in transnational law to emerge, so that the critical appropriation of human rights can fi nd a way to gain traction in the arena of legal and political debate. We can use the language of human rights in order, fi nally, as Th eodor Adorno put it, "to put a spark to all this antiquated mustiness, which may even blow it apart". 83 Transnational social rights are thus directed in a polemical way against the existing system of rights. We thereby enter a confl ict of laws. Without pólemos, that is, without a fi ght, without argument, without dissent, a new and diff erent world will remain out of reach. Transnational social rights gently endeavour to achieve the coarsest demand: the ideal of emancipation.
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